The article deals with the question of how German members of the European Parliament Islam and Christianity through their parliamentary activities which is similar, though less politicised, to cultural boundaries often produced in public debates in Germany. Third, the article illustrates similar patterns of religious affiliation and subjective religiosity among German parliamentarians in both the European Parliament and the national parliament, which to some degree also reflect societal trends in Germany. Yet our data also suggests that European political elites are more religious than the average German population. If the presence of religion in terms of religious interest-groups and arguments is included, the German parliament appears to be more religious than the European Parliament.
Introduction
Germany is the largest member-state of the European Union (EU). Germans thus constitute the largest national group within the European Parliament (EP). Germany can furthermore be considered a unique case in Europe in terms of how religion and the state as well as the political sphere are linked with each other. The close cooperation of the state with the Protestant and Catholic Churches, particularly on issues of providing social welfare, and the Germany shows an increasing trend towards religious pluralisation (Table 1) . Even though the proportion of Muslims is still relatively low, resentment against Islam and Muslims in Germany is gaining currency (de Nève 2013; Götze, Jaeckel, and Pickel 2013) .
Increasing levels of religious plurality furthermore challenge the prevailing church-state system in Germany with its privileging of Christian and Jewish communities. Some have therefore argued that either the 'limping separation' should be extended and applied to all religions or religion separated more strictly (Cavuldak 2013, 332; Pickel 2013, 98 Source: Götze, Jaeckel, and Pickel 2013, 284. Growing levels of religious pluralisation and Islamophobia have contributed to an increase in public discourses on religion (Pickel 2013, 67) . Since religion is often problematised as a cause of conflict in these discourses, this politicisation does not contradict the constant loss of importance of religion at individual and societal levels; rather, both processes are mutually constitutive (Pickel 2013, 96) . Most prevalent have been debates on Muslims and Islam in Germany, such as on Muslim headscarves in public institutions, on the willingness of young Muslims to integrate, or on violent Salafism. These debates often confound issues of religion and migration (Spielhaus 2013) and position a 'discrete cultural Christianity' against an 'ostentatious' Islam (Wohlrab-Sahr 2003) . However, the role of religion in society has also been debated with regard to Christianity and the Christian churches, focusing, for example, on crucifixes in public institutions, on religious education in state schools, on Pope Benedict XVI speaking in the German Bundestag, on sexual and physical abuse of children by members of the clergy and other church employees, on working contracts within church and church-related welfare institutions, and on the refusal of emergency contraception in confessional hospitals.
The churches have actively participated in most of these debates, as well as in debates on moral and ethical issues such as stem cell research, prenatal diagnosis and late-term abortions, euthanasia, equal rights for same-sex relationships and family policy. They do not restrict their participation in public discourses to an exclusively sacral sphere, where the preservation and practice of religious rituals takes place, but have transformed themselves into a particular sort of modern interest group. 4 They not only publicly defend their institutional interests in keeping their privileged legal status in Germany and promote their value orientations, for example on marriage, family, sexual orientation, education or medical ethics, they also, according to their abovementioned social role, put forward moral demands, speaking up on issues such as social justice, asylum law, climate change, the environment, peace, development and human rights (Gerngroß 2010, 92; Sebaldt and Straßner 2004, 122-127; Willems 2007, 321-322) . European integration has been supported by both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches in Germany (Minkenberg 2009 (Minkenberg , 1203 (Minkenberg -1206 .
In sum, the model of dealing with religion in Germany, facing continuing trends of individual and societal secularisation as well as religious pluralisation and the politicisation of religion, is located between close cooperation with the churches, primarily on issues of social justice and development, on the one hand, and using religion, primarily Islam, for cultural demarcation, on the other. We now turn to the EP to explore whether and how German MEPs represent this model through their perceptions and parliamentary activities.
German members of the European Parliament and religion

Studying the German group in the EP
The 99 Germans represent the largest group of MEPs in the EP. In the seventh parliamentary term (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) , the largest share of the German MEPs belongs to the European People's Party (EPP), the second-largest group to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Other MEPs identify as Greens (Greens/EFA), Liberals (ALDE) and members of the Left (UEL/NGL) ( Table 2) .
We approached the German group in the EP using three different methods. First, 25
German MEPs filled in the RelEP questionnaire (response rate: 25.25%). The distribution among political parties is fairly representative, with a slight bias towards the Greens, and a disproportionately low share of Liberals, female MEPs, and MEPs born in the 1960s (Table   2 ). There might be a bias towards MEPs with stronger interests in religion (or in keeping 4
The classification of the churches as organised interests, however, is contested (Willems 2007, 318-321) . religion out of the European political sphere) within the sample as many rejections of interview requests were based on the statement that the MEP asked would not be an expert on or interested in the issue and could therefore not provide any information on the subject. We therefore complement the data from the survey with qualitative interviews with 20 MEPs out of the 25, who filled in the questionnaire and who were willing to be interviewed as well, and, finally, a qualitative content-analysis of all German MEPs' parliamentary activities.
The qualitative content-analysis covers all speeches in plenary, motions for resolutions, and parliamentary questions of German MEPs during the 7 th parliamentary term (cut-off date: 7 June 2013). The data were collected from the personal homepages of the MEPs on the website of the EP. First, we researched all activities (5324 speeches, 2334 participations in motions, 2848 participations in questions 5 ) using various keywords relating to religion. 6 In a second step, we sorted out all contributions which only casually mentioned one of the keywords without really focusing on the issue of religion. We then coded the
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As the research presented here uses the MEP as level of analysis and since most motions and questions are issued by a group of MEPs, these numbers do not represent the number of motions and questions but exceed it.
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The privileged social role of the churches in Germany can also be recognised in how German
MEPs interact with religious interest-groups. Although most of them consider contacts with religious interest-groups to be secondary in their work, the frequency of their contacts is comparatively high.
Half of the surveyed German MEPs frequently deal with religion in their parliamentary work. More than half of the MEPs (52%) think that religion primarily plays out as a personal source of inspiration for decision-making, especially for the German MEPs who consider themselves religious. The consulted MEPs who do not define themselves religious do not perceive any impact of religion on their work (12%) or see religion only as an external phenomenon that sometimes needs to be dealt with (20%). Contact with religion as an interest-group, trying to influence the work of MEPs, is only secondary in the MEPs' perception, despite frequent contacts between some of the German MEPs and religious interest-groups.
Most of the included German MEPs have regular contacts with religious (or secularist)
interest-groups. Contacts are somewhat more frequent than those of domestic German politicians, but considerably more frequent than the average for MEPs from other countries (see Foret in this volume) and for domestic parliamentarians from other countries ( Table 3 ).
The survey of German MEPs suggests a strong positive association between the religiosity of the MEP and the frequency of contacts (all MEPs who reported contacts at least once a month or once a week were religious). The political factor, in contrast, seems to be less relevant.
Although the MEPs with contacts at least once a week are all members of the EEP, MEPs with contacts at least once a month or several times a year come from all parties, including the UEL/NGL. The most frequent contacts are with the A 'special case' in the debate about religion in EP politics is the accession of Turkey to the EU, which is not only about adding one more country to the EU but also about the identity and the borders of Europe (Minkenberg 2012, 150) . 68% of the German respondents think that religion is an important issue in the debate about Turkey's accession, but many of them perceive this impact only in a subtle way, for instance when opponents of Turkey's accession highlight cultural differences to obscure their reservations against Islam. The fact that the major German churches have been sceptical about Turkey's accession to the EU, primarily on grounds of non-respect for religious freedom and of cultural and value-based differences from the other EU members (Minkenberg 2012, 160-163) , also suggests a more hidden religious factor in the EP, although religion is not explicitly referred to in debates. 32% think religion does not play a role at all.
Religion itself is not regarded by most of the surveyed German MEPs as an issue requiring a common approach by the EU. The case of a reference to the Christian heritage in the Treaty of Lisbon, by contrast, is clearly an issue that divides the included German MEPs into two groups: believers in the EPP and all others. That a reference to the Christian heritage or even God was not included in the Treaty, despite extensive mobilising by EPP members and religious organisations, suggests that there is no majority in the EP for overtly religious positions.
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Religious affiliation and religiosity: German MEPs and MBs in comparison
One important question in the study of religion and political elites is whether political elites mirror religious trends within their societies (Oermann 2007: 151) . Therefore, we shall now assess whether German politics at the European level is more or less secularised than at the national level, and whether parliamentarians represent the religious social structure of German
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This assumption corresponds to the impression of some of the interviewed MEPs. Another anecdotal evidence from our interviews for this assumption is the failed attempt of an Italian MEP to establish an intergroup on Christian family values. (Oermann 2007, 157-158) . Recently the proportion of Protestants has dropped below the proportion of Catholics in the Bundestag (Figure 1 ). The majority of MBs do not specify their Figure 1 . Denominations in the German Bundestag, 1990 Bundestag, -2010 . 
Source: Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen
Source: Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2010.
A similar distribution can be found among the German MEPs in the EP. All included MEPs from the EPP (as well as ALDE) also define themselves as religious (with two exceptions who did not want to provide information on this question). The majority of them attend church more than once a year. Other groups, such as the S&D, the Greens and the Left, are more mixed with respect to the presence of both religious and non-religious MEPs. Although the total numbers included in the survey are small, they do suggest that the EPP among German MEPs is the most religious group, and the S&D and the Left are the least religious: the five convinced atheists from our (extended) sample (11.1%) are members of these two groups.
66.7% of German MEPs who responded to our surveys define themselves as religious.
In the German Bundestag, about 60% of the MBs do so (Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2010). Both numbers correspond relatively well with the number of believers in German society, where about two thirds believe in a God (Pickel 2013, 83) . As in society at large, the proportion of believers in the German Bundestag has decreased: from about 70% in 1990 to 60% in 2010 (Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2010).
Our data thus suggest relatively similar patterns of religious affiliation and religiosity in the EP and the German Bundestag. This to some degree also represents societal trends in Germany. However, German political elites appear to be more Christian and religious than the German average population.
If we compare the presence of religion in terms of religious interest-groups and arguments, though, the Bundestag seems to be more religious than the EP. According to 
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